

MR 203(12), Sec. 6 - O.S.S. NUMBERED BULLETINS

MR 203(12), Sec. 6 - O.S.S. NUMBERED BULLETINS
January-April, 1945

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By PHD Date FEB 10 1972

Map Room
Box 73

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By PHD Date FEB 10 1972

Jan-Apr, 1945

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONTROL

9 April 1945

RS

4-9

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A
No. 2419, "Border Disputes between Thailand and French *closed*
Indochina", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of
this office and classified as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-78
By *BAH* Date FEB 10 1972

203(12)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONTROL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONTROL

31 March 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A
No. 2436, "The Organization of Markets in the Chemical-
Nitrogen Industry, 1903-38", prepared in the Research
and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as
confidential/control.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer

William L. Langer
Chief, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RHP Date FEB 10 1972

203(12)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONTROL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 March 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A
No. 2965, "New Trends Toward Totalitarianism in Argentina",
prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office
and classified as secret.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By *RHP* Date FEB 10 1972

203(14)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 March 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. Class
2056, "The Ports of Germany", prepared in the Research and
Analysis Branch of this office and classified as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

Enclosure
(Copy No. 111)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RHP Date FEB 10 1972

203(12)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

13 March 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of each of the following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office:

R & A No. 2723, "Review of Official Discussions of Criteria for the Regulation of Armaments, 1920-1933" (Copy No. —)

R & A No. 2662, "Greek Territorial Claims and Aspirations" (Copy No. 62)

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

Enclosures (2)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RBH Date FEB 10 1972

Regraded Unclassified

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


SECRET

12 March 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information
is copy of a memorandum which the Director, OSS, is
sending today to the President, concerning Japanese
military demands on Thailand.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By SR Date NOV 20 1973

203(12)

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

12 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Kandy has transmitted the following information:

On the night of 9 March, the Japanese Military Staff in Bangkok demanded that Thailand close its Indo-China border, seize the arms of all French soldiers crossing the border, and arrest all Indo-Chinese and French residents in Thailand. Furthermore, the Thai were refused contact with their diplomatic representatives in Indo-China. The Japanese explained that their request for further controls in Indo-China had been refused by the Decoux Government on the morning of 9 March, whereupon the Japanese took over the control of all communications and began disarming French Indo-China troops and police. Fighting had begun by the night of 9 March with the Japanese moving against French Indo-China positions at Saigon and Hanoi.

The Thai Cabinet, being in no position to resist, agreed to comply with the Japanese demands and to hold Thai troops in a state of readiness. Later, however, high Thai

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By SR Date NOV 20 1973

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officials urged source to advise the Allies to bomb Indo-China communications objectives immediately, pointing out that such a step would stimulate the resistance of the local population.

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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Regraded Unclassified

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 March 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No.
2579, "Export Surpluses, Import Requirements, and Rail and
Water Traffic of South Germany", prepared in the Research
and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as
confidential.

Sincerely yours

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

Enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By *RHP* Date *FEB 10 1972*

203(17)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

24 February 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is
copy of a memorandum which the Acting Director, OSS, is
sending today to the President, concerning the report
that Kesselring and Rahn are ready to surrender.

John Magruder
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

2-24

Enclosure.

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR Date NOV 27 1973

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203(12)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 February 1945

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By Authority of

CIA

00 7622

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

By SR Date NOV 21 1973

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, has been supplied by a source of uncertain reliability, but appears plausible in the light of information from other sources available to the representative:

An official of the German Embassy in North Italy whose name source did not disclose has come to Switzerland to convert to Swiss francs some marks belonging to members of Marshal Kesselring's staff. This official declares that Marshal Kesselring and Rudolph Rahn, Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy, are ready to surrender and even to fight against Hitler, if the Allies can make it worth their while. Kesselring, according to the official, feels that under present trends he is destined to retire to the Alps and, subordinate to SS officials, to die in the final resistance or be killed for not resisting the Allies. As long as Kesselring is still in Italy he feels he still has power and is willing to use that power to surrender, in return for concessions. The official did not make it clear as to whether concessions to Kesselring and his staff or to Germany in general are desired.

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[Attention is invited to memorandum dated 9 February,
concerning Kesselring's attitude toward negotiating with the
Western Allies.]

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR Date NOV 27 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


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22 February 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information
is copy of a memorandum which the Director, OSS, is
sending today to the President, and which deals with
present conditions in Hungary.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR Date NOV 27 1973

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203(12)

Regraded Unclassified

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 February 1945

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative has transmitted the following information, obtained by trustworthy sources in mid-February from four members of the Hungarian Provisional Government and the chiefs of the Hungarian Red Cross now in Debrecen. The OSS representative evaluates the information F-3.

The Hungarian Provisional Government is virtually cut off from the outside world, since no adequate transportation, radio or telegraph communications are available to it. One car is the sole means of transportation for the entire Cabinet. The Soviet command and the ACC in Debrecen have radio and telephone communications with Budapest, Moscow and other places, and possess good cars and trucks.

The Government may communicate with the Americans or British only through the Soviet ACC at Debrecen, headed by Marshal Voroshilov and including a staff of some 325 other officers.

The food situation in Debrecen is critical. Of the former 350 doctors in Debrecen only 60 remain. Typhus has broken out. The Germans and the Russians have destroyed or taken away medical supplies.

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By SK Date

NOV 27 1973

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There is urgent need for UNRRA assistance, for medical supplies, food, clothing, and transportation. The Hungarians, however, are afraid to ask the Western Allies for assistance lest the Soviets misinterpret such a request.

As of 14 February, 9000 Hungarian soldiers were being held as prisoners in Debrecen. Previously they had been released as the nucleus of the new army, but they were seized again as prisoners of war, by order of Marshal Malinovski. Moscow is now to determine their status.

Hungarian officials claim that the Soviets are moving large groups of persons from the rural areas, and that 200,000 such persons have already been sent to the USSR. Spring planting has been reduced by 80 percent due to the loss of farmstock and equipment.

Famine and disease is reported in Budapest. The Government plans to remain in Debrecen at least six weeks longer.

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR Date NOV 27 1973

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APPENDIX

Sub-sources mentioned in foregoing Memorandum:

Minister of War, Janos Voros,

Minister of Education, Geza Teleki

Minister of Health, Eric Molnar

Secretary to Premier Bela Miklos, Tarnay

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By SR

NOV 27 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


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21 February 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information
is copy of a memorandum which the Director, OSS, is
sending today to the President. This memorandum
sets forth the attitudes of Polish army officers to-
wards returning to Poland.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By Authority of CIA
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By SR NOV 27 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

21 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in London, has been supplied by a usually reliable source in the Polish Ministry of Information:

President Wladislaw Raczekiewicz is seriously considering the idea of releasing the armed forces, under the control of the London Government, from their oath of allegiance. Such a step would enable soldiers and officers individually to decide whether to place themselves at the disposal of the proposed provisional government in Poland and return to the homeland, to offer themselves to the Western Allies as mercenaries, or to take such other action as they see fit. The intransigence among the rank and file of these Polish forces appears to be diminishing in favor of a more realistic outlook. Several Generals and a considerable number of Polish army officers of all ranks are reported privately to have indicated a readiness to return to the new Poland. The most important of these is reported to be General Stanislaw Maczek, commander of the Polish First Armored

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Division on the Western Front. The majority of the officers and men under his command are said to hold similar views.

Source believes that many other Polish officers of all ranks would declare themselves in favor of returning to Poland, except for the recent statement by General Michal Rola-Zymierski that the new regime will deal harshly with high-ranking officers and will only accept those below the rank of major. Even among the Polish General Staff in London sentiment appears to be veering towards a return to Poland. Surprising activity in favor of a return is reported taking place on high levels of the General Staff Deuxieme Bureau (Intelligence). General Tabor, deputy Chief of Staff, has repeatedly mentioned that he favors returning home, though General Stanislaw Kopanski, the Chief of Staff, remains undecided. Opposition to a return is apparently still prevalent in the Polish Navy and in the Polish Corps under the command of General Anders in Italy.

Source's Czech contacts report that the following three former Polish leaders are actively participating in the formation of the new government: ex-President Stanislaw Wojciechowski; the aged ex-President Wicenty Witos, and the

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR

NOV 27 1973

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well-known Socialist leader, Puzak. Source comments that the participation of Puzak or some other well-known Socialist in the provisional government could effect a complete reversal in the hitherto irreconcilable position of the Socialists in London. Among the latter, Jan Stanczyk and Ludwig Grosfeld reportedly already are willing to go to Poland if Mikolajczyk does.

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA

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By SA NOV 27 1973

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Regraded Unclassified

~~RESTRICTED~~
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

17 February 1946

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No.
2565, "Structure and Personnel of the Nanking Puppet - *Filled in almost*
Government", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch
of this office and classified as restricted.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

Enclosure

2023 (2)

~~RESTRICTED~~

2-17

Regraded Unclassified

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


2 February 1945

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TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information
is copy of a dispatch received from the London office
of this agency, concerning attempts to shift responsi-
bilities for failures in Germany.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

EX-100
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 4(D) or (2)
CIA memo
By SLR Date DEC 21 1977

203(14)

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2-2

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 February 1945

~~SECRET~~

GERMANY: Attempts to Shift Responsibilities for Failures.

The following information on Germany obtained from British intelligence, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London:

The director of a large south German concern interviewed in a neutral country in early January, reported the following:

Heinrich Himmler and Martin Bormann currently are engaged in a large-scale battle for power which Himmler is expected to win. Bormann blames Himmler and his brutal methods for alienating the people and the Wehrmacht from the Party. Himmler, in turn, blames Bormann and the Nazi Party leadership for the mistakes which have been made in past years.

"Thinking Germans" are disappointed and amazed by the ineptness of Anglo-American propaganda, which they claim is playing directly into Goebbels' hands and is stiffening the resistance of the average German, thus prolonging the war.

Hitler no longer feels at home in Berchtesgaden, and instead spends much of his time in the village of Dorfen, between Muehldorf and Wasserburg and about 15 kilometers from Wasserburg. Himmler's headquarters and personal staff are reported to be established at Fuschl on the Wolfgangsee.

Colonel von Linstow, then Chief of Staff to Stulpnagel in Paris, was hanged for arresting SS leaders in the French capital on 20 July, apparently in connection with the attempt on Hitler's life. Stulpnagel attempted suicide, but is reported still to be alive, though blinded.

The following information was supplied by an untested source:

Dr. Bruno Kleist, who took over Rosenberg's former functions in Soviet affairs and more recently was responsible for a softening of German policies in the Baltic States, was arrested by the Sicherheitsdienst at the Echterdingen airdrome near Stuttgart at the end of December, just as he was about to board a plane for Madrid and Lisbon. Though he possessed

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By Authority of State Dept

Inst 12 Apr. & 8 July 1976

By SR Date DEC 21 1977

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- 2 -

travel orders issued by von Ribbentrop, his protestations were in vain and his subsequent fate is unknown. He is thought to have been on another mission to seek contact with the Soviets and broach to them the possibility of peace negotiations. Ribbentrop sent Kleist on a similar mission to Stockholm in July 1943. He was then instructed to contact Madame Kollantsy, the Soviet Ambassador, but the Soviets showed no interest and the mission was unsuccessful. Kleist's work for Ribbentrop is regarded as similar to that which Langbehn has been carrying out in Switzerland for Himmler.

(The British have received other reports indicating that Himmler is actively intriguing against Ribbentrop and Rosenberg in order to shift to them the blame for the German failures in the Baltic countries.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 31 January)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 February 1945

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2-1

*Major Putnam
Believe Adm will
be interested -*

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information
is copy of a memorandum which the Acting Director,
OSS, is sending today to the President. This memo-
randum summarizes new authoritative information on
the 20 July German coup d'état, which was transmit-
ted by the OSS representative in Bern.

John Magruder
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

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Enclosure.

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By Authority of CIA
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By SR Date NOV 27 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 February 1945

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By Authority of

CIA

007632

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

By SR Date NOV 27 1973

The enclosed memorandum summarizes new authoritative information on the 20 July German coup d'état, obtained from one of the active participants in the plot, and the reasons which he has given for the failure of the putsch.

The 20 July coup appears to have failed primarily because:

- (a) The conspirators were unnerved by two previous failures.
- (b) General Fellgiebel failed to destroy communications at Hitler's East Prussia headquarters, and thus allowed word to get out that the bomb explosion had not killed Hitler before the plotters in the German War Ministry could seize power.
- (c) The defection of Major Remer at the eleventh hour tipped off Dr. Goebbels to the conspiracy.
- (d) The plotters, planning the coup along strictly military lines, failed to plan adequately to deal with the efficient Nazi police. They elected to seize buildings rather than key Nazi individuals, and failed to arrange for military forces to reach Berlin in time.

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(e) By July the plotters had come to a disagreement as to which of the Allies they should surrender to and as to the orientation of the proposed new government. The younger, active leaders like Colonel von Stauffenberg favored a pro-Soviet policy. The older and more conservative figures wanted to turn to the Western Allies. The younger men were encouraged to a Soviet orientation by a feeling that Allied policy gave no hope for Germany's future and as a result of alleged assurances from the Free Germany Committee in Moscow that Germany would receive a just peace from the Soviets and the Wehrmacht would not be wholly disarmed.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 February 1945

THE GERMAN COUP D'ETAT (Continued)

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to a memorandum dated 22 July 1944 and subsequent memoranda concerning the "German Coup d'Etat" of 20 July 1944. The source for this information is a member and former emissary of the conspiratorial group who had a prominent part in the plot, and who has recently escaped to Switzerland. He apparently is the only one of the active plotters to reach safety.

The 20 July coup was the third attempt by the conspirators to kill Hitler and seize power. The first attempt was made on 6 July in Munich. It failed when Hitler suddenly and unexpectedly departed from the city. A second attempt was made on 16 July in East Prussia. It failed when Major General Hellmuth Stieff [later executed] lost his nerve and failed to place the bomb. The conspirators' military forces had already begun their march on Berlin, before the news of this failure had been received. This troop movement was afterward explained away as

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By SR Date NOV 27 1973

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"exercise". The plotters felt, however, that this explanation could not be used again without arousing suspicion. On 20 July, therefore, the troops were set in motion only after the bomb had actually exploded, and consequently these forces did not reach the conspirators' headquarters in the War Ministry on Bendlerstrasse in time.

By 20 July the nerves of von Stauffenberg and the other participants had reached or passed the breaking point. There was no clear directing hand. The younger officers who had the nerve to proceed, like von Stauffenberg, were too young and inexperienced. The older officers, though courageous, lacked energy and decision. Some, like General Erich Fellgiebel [later reported executed], Inspector General of the German Army Signal Corps, failed to carry out their part. Fellgiebel was supposed to destroy the Central Information Office and all communication installations at the East Prussia headquarters where the bomb was placed. The plan was to isolate Hitler and his staff in these headquarters so that even if Hitler were not killed, he would not be able to publicize the fact until the plotters had gained full control. The defection of Major Remer at the last minute also contributed to the failure of the coup.

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[When Remer received orders from the plotters at the Bendlerstrasse to march the troops at his disposal, he reported first to Goebbels and thus disclosed the plot to the Nazis.]

When von Stauffenberg reached the Berlin airport, after placing the bomb, he telephoned the conspirators at the Bendlerstrasse that everything was all right and told them to go ahead. General Friederich Olbricht, Chief of the General Army Office [later courtmartialled and shot], set in motion the military forces. When von Stauffenberg arrived at the War Ministry, he admitted uncertainty as to whether Hitler was dead, to which Colonel General Ludwig Beck [who later committed suicide] replied, "For us, he is dead." About this time Marshal Keitel, unaware that Olbricht and others were in the plot, telephoned to the War Ministry and to all military commanders that Hitler was alive.

Source was saved from arrest by the fact that he had already left with a message from Beck to Wolf Graf Helldorf, head of the Berlin police [later reported executed], and SS and Police General Arthur Nebe [fate unknown], at Police headquarters. Source passed through the troops under Remer, which he thought were on their way to seize the Bendlerstrasse for the

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plotters, but were actually en route to arrest the plotters at the Bendlerstrasse. Source first learned of the fiasco while he was with Helldorf. He also learned then that Nebe had been asked to send his SS police officials to East Prussia to begin an investigation of the bombing.

Helldorf and those others who were not caught at the Bendlerstrasse then tried in vain to establish alibis for themselves. Source could not even try that because his presence in Berlin was unauthorized. He found refuge in Berlin where he stayed in virtual solitary isolation until he managed to escape by using false identification papers. He was not arrested by the Nazis as previous reports from the conspiratorial group had indicated⁷. Source believes that Dr. Carl Friederich Goerdler, co-leader with General Beck of the conspiratorial group, is still alive. Goerdler, he says, was sent out of Berlin by von Stauffenberg a few days before 20 July. Goerdler was subsequently arrested by the Nazis. Other reliable reports have indicated that the Nazis were keeping Goerdler for future use.⁷

In general, source indicates that the plot failed for the following reasons:

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Prior to source's arrival in Berlin on 11 July, the plans had been made along strictly military lines and the police aspects were largely neglected. The plotters relied upon the occupation of government buildings rather than making plans to arrest key Nazi individuals. When the plans for the use of the military were executed too slowly, counter-measures by the Nazi police wrecked the whole program.

Another important reason for the failure was the last-minute divergence of views among the plotters. Von Stauffenberg and his younger immediate collaborators reached a decision in favor of an Eastern solution which would involve opening the fronts at once to the USSR without even trying to negotiate with the Soviets. Von Stauffenberg alleged to his fellow conspirators that he had been in touch with General von Seydlitz and the Free Germany Committee in Moscow. He said he had obtained assurances from von Seydlitz, through Madame Kollantay, the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, that Germany would receive a fair peace and that the Wehrmacht would not be completely disarmed. Trott zu Solz [later executed] had tried to contact the British in Stockholm, and having received no encouragement, had also come to favor an Eastern solution and gave his support to von Stauffenberg.

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As a result, the plotters disagreed as to the composition of the government they planned to set up. The conservative, Western-oriented group of older men favored a government headed by Goerdler and General Beck. The younger, pro-Soviet faction, while willing to have Beck as Chief of State, wanted a leftist premier like Hans Leuschner, a prominent Socialist and former Minister of the Interior in Hesse, or preferably Dr. Julius Leber, a former right-wing Social Democrat Deputy. It would seem highly unlikely that either Leuschner or Leber would have proved acceptable to the Soviets.⁷

The younger men like von Stauffenberg constituted the dynamic force in the plot. The older men, though disagreeing on policy, cooperated, on the theory that anything was better than Hitler. The younger men like von Stauffenberg and Trott zu Solz saw in American policy, or lack of policy, no hope for Germany's future, and therefore were prepared to take their chances with the USSR.

Source foresees only chaos for Germany. He says that the Germans expect a harsh but realistic policy from the USSR. They believe that the Soviets will need Germany's economic resources and will permit Eastern Germany to work, though it may

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only be for Soviet benefit. On the other hand, they feel that the Western Powers are not interested in seeing any economic life rebuilt in Germany. Hence the Germans feel little hope for a Germany under American or British occupation.

A prominent and well-placed German industrialist, according to British intelligence reports, states that "thinking Germans are amazed and disappointed by the ineptness of Allied propaganda", which they feel is playing directly into Goebbels' hands and stiffening the will to resist of the average German, thus prolonging the war.⁷

Source believes that the conditions in Germany which American and British occupying forces will have to meet will seem so intolerable to persons accustomed to the Western way of life and Western culture, that it will be next to impossible, from the point of view of morale and living conditions alone, to maintain occupying forces in Germany. The Soviets are hardened to such things, source comments. In any event, he adds, the cities in the "Soviet zone", with the exception of Berlin, will have suffered less destruction from bombing than the other German cities.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


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31 January 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information
is copy of a memorandum which the Acting Director,
OSS, is sending today to the President, dealing with
proposals now under discussion for a United Yugoslav
Government.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR Date NOV 27 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

31 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following communication has been received from the OSS representative in Caserta:

In connection with proposals for a United Yugoslav Government, currently under discussion, there are indications that Washington may be considering sending to Belgrade provisional representatives instead of fully accredited diplomatic missions.

In recent discussions with Tito and his advisors, especially with respect to Norden's coming to Belgrade, it has seemed clear to me that Tito was concerned lest the United States should try to introduce political agents who would report on activities but would not be regularly accredited. It was only after I had assured him that Norden would come as a member of a military mission and would confine himself to routine consular and administrative matters, that clearance was finally granted.

Tito's readiness to continue to deal with Subasich appears to be based largely on the assumption that he will thereby obtain satisfactory recognition by the major powers. Were he to suspect that this would not be forthcoming, his outlook on the entire matter might change. While he might be persuaded to accept provisionally accredited ambassadors, it is doubtful that he would accept much

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less, especially if he thinks the British and the Soviets are prepared to give him more.

Important as recognition is to Tito, his program is even more so. He is unlikely, for the sake of recognition, to jeopardize the achievement of his objectives by relaxing the control which he now exercises over the country. He would, even less likely be persuaded to modify his objectives in exchange for recognition. It is therefore improbable that any diplomatic representative, whatever his status, could influence local developments.

The situation in Yugoslavia is hardly analogous to that in countries like France, where the leader of the liberation movement depended upon Allied armies for support. Even if it were possible for the opposition to take action with the King at their head and under the most favorable circumstances, competent foreign observers in Yugoslavia believe that Tito, without outside help, could suppress any uprising in a matter of weeks. Tito has mobilized almost all of the able-bodied youth, he has concentrated all the weapons in his hands, imprisoned most of the potential opposition leaders, seized control of the political machinery and press, and, above all, possesses the necessary ruthless determination.

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By Authority of CIA

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

By SR Date NOV 27 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

30 January 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A
No. 2553, "The Organization of the French Intelligence
Services", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch
of this office and classified as secret/control.

*destroyed
2/2/45
E L H*

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73
By RHP Date FEB 10 1972

203(14)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

25 January 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A
No. 2740, "Russia and the International Trade Union Move-
ment", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of
this office and classified as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73
By *BBP* Date FEB 10 1972

Regraded Unclassified

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

~~SECRET~~
CONTROL

13 January 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy each of the
following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis
Branch of this office:

R&A 2773, "Significant Developments in
the German Position during the crop
year, 1944-1945" - Copy No. 5

R&A 23188, "British Policy in Italy"
Copy No. 62

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Enclosures (2)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RHP Date FEB 10 1972

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CONTROL

203(14)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 2773

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GERMAN FOOD POSITION

Description

A discussion of recent developments affecting the over-all supply and local availability of food in Germany: the decline in agricultural production; territorial losses; the availability of stocks; difficulties in transportation and distribution; and the deterioration of administrative controls.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

9 January 1945

Copy No. 5

(61121)

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RAH Date FEB 10 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

1. The gradual deterioration in the German food position which began in 1939-40 is continuing at an accelerated rate. The sharp curtailment in the allotments of nitrogenous fertilizer in 1943-44 was reflected in a considerable reduction in crop yields in 1944 in spite of generally favorable weather conditions. At the same time, Germany lost control of some of her most important food-surplus areas. German takings in occupied Europe this year will be reduced to about one-third of her total net imports and requisitions in 1943-44. If the loss of imports is added to the decline in domestic production, it appears that in one year the total supply of original food energy dropped by 10 percent, an amount exceeding the total decline of the previous five years.

2. The extent to which this decline will be reflected in an actual curtailment of the caloric intake per capita will depend mainly on the ability of the Reich Food Estate to enforce the necessary adjustments in food production and utilization. There are, however, signs that these controls are beginning to weaken, particularly in areas close to the front lines. Stocks, nevertheless, are amply sufficient to tide over Germany to the next harvest. Moreover, Germany is saving her accumulated reserves for future emergencies by cutting rations to a bare minimum -- less than 2200 calories

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

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RHP

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per capita per day for the average non-farm civilian, and less than 1900 calories for the normal consumer. By comparison, the average daily consumption of the non-farm civilian exceeds 3000 calories in the United States, and 2800 calories in the United Kingdom

3. Germany's concern for her stockpile may be explained in part by difficulties in transportation and distribution which have increased the need for local reserves. Local breakdowns in food distribution, superimposed on a generally tight food supply, are disrupting Germany's war effort where it counts most -- behind the front lines, particularly in Western Germany. Local food shortages may well assume major proportions in the course of the current crop year, but the full impact of the deterioration in the German food position will not be felt until 1945-46, when stocks will be running low and when this year's drastic curtailment in fertilizer allotments will have resulted in a further decline in production.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GERMAN FOOD POSITION

I. THE FIRST FIVE WAR YEARS

In the late 1930's, the original production of food energy from the soil had reached a peak of 230 trillion calories annually in the Old Reich. During the war years, owing chiefly to the shortage of phosphate fertilizer and other input factors, production declined gradually to about 210 trillion calories in 1943. At the same time, Germany was cut off from her overseas supplies which contributed a substantial part of her normal pre-war imports of about 22 trillion calories.¹ Nevertheless, Germany was able to a large extent to replace her overseas supplies by imports and requisitions in German-controlled and occupied countries. By 1943-44, Germany's net takings in terms of total food energy had almost regained the normal peacetime level, but consisted of a higher proportion of starchy foods and feedstuffs (grain, potatoes) and a lower proportion of fats and concentrated feedstuffs.

The total supply of original food energy from domestic sources and imports thus declined between the late 1930's and 1943-44 only by about 8 percent, from 252 to 230 trillion calories. During the same period, however, the total population

1. Shortly before the war, German food imports rose to 26-28 trillion calories, but about one-fifth of this was added to stocks.

to be fed increased by 8 million foreign workers and prisoners of war, or more than one-tenth. Requirements for industrial use and seed¹ also increased.

Nevertheless, the average caloric intake per capita declined by less than 10 percent. This result was achieved by a substantial diversion of productive resources from livestock feed to food; for the ultimate food energy produced from an acre devoted to crops for direct human consumption is four or five times as great as that obtained from livestock raised with the feed produced on an acre of land. The saving of food energy, however, was bought at the price of a considerable deterioration in the quality of the diet; the share of animal products in Germany's food supply declined from one-third to less than one-fifth of the total calories. The rather drastic adjustments in the pattern of production and utilization were facilitated by the existence of highly efficient production and utilization controls.

II. FOOD SITUATION IN THE SIXTH WAR YEAR

In the current economic year, the German food position is deteriorating at an accelerated rate. The crop year 1943-44 saw the first really drastic curtailment in the allotments of nitrogenous fertilizer, to about 50 percent of the pre-war consumption. This cut was immediately reflected in 1. The shortage of fertilizer necessitated a 10 percent increase in the quantity of seed per hectare. See NS
[REDACTED] September 1944.

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Dep't. letter, 1-11-74

a sharp reduction in crop yields in 1944 which took place in spite of generally favorable weather conditions. The primary production of food energy in 1944 amounts to about 200 trillion calories, or 13 percent below pre-war. At the same time, Germany lost control over some of her most important food surplus areas. German takings in occupied Europe this year will not exceed 7 trillion calories, or about one-third of her total net imports and requisitions for 1943-44. In that year, foreign areas controlled by Germany produced a net surplus of 4.5 million tons of grain.¹ Foreign areas controlled by Germany at the beginning of the current crop year (1944-45), on the other hand, produce a net surplus of only 1,200,000 tons of grain, the 2,000,000-ton surplus of surplus areas (essentially Western Poland) being offset by an 800,000-ton deficit of grain-deficit areas (Austria, Norway, etc.). Recent military developments thus deprived Germany of 75 percent of her grain imports. She also lost about 45 percent of her imports of potatoes, 25 percent of her sugar imports, 70 percent of her imports of dry legumes, 75 percent of her imports of fresh vegetables and fruits, 70 percent of her imports of meat, 80 percent of her imports of fats and oils, 20 percent of her imports of fish, and 70 percent of her imports of eggs. Germany thus finds herself cut off from 13 percent of the total grain

1. Surpluses of surplus areas: 6,000,000 tons; deficits of deficit areas: 1,800,000 tons.

supplies available to her in 1943-44,¹ 4 percent of her supplies of potatoes and sugar, one-third of her supplies of dry legumes, 12 percent of her vegetables and fruits, 15 percent of her meat and fat supplies, 12 percent of her fish, and 8 percent of her eggs. If the loss of imports is added to the decline in domestic production, it appears that in one year the total supply of original food energy dropped by 10 percent, an amount exceeding the total decline in the previous five years.²

The extent to which this decline in the total available food energy will be reflected in an actual curtailment in the per capita caloric intake will depend essentially on the ability of the Reich Food Estate to enforce the necessary adjustments in food production and utilization. In particular, it will depend on its effectiveness in bringing about a further reduction in livestock numbers and in maintaining strict controls over food distribution.

There are signs that these controls are beginning to weaken. In the past, hoarding and illegal feeding of crops on the farm was on the whole successfully prevented by the use of price incentives and the threat of severe penalties for any failure to comply with surrender quotas. The black market was effectively kept in check. Enforcement of these regulations was entrusted to an extensive, tightly knit, centrally controlled. Domestic production plus net imports in 1943-44. [redacted] calories to 207 trillion calories.

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

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By

Date

trolled [redacted] organization able to maintain a close check on the production of each farm. Enforcement did not constitute a serious problem so long as the effectiveness and authority of this organization and confidence in the currency were unimpaired.

Recent reports suggest, however, that, for the first time since the outbreak of war, serious weaknesses have appeared in the structure of food controls. Like other administrative agencies, the Reich Food Estate is being "combed out" in the course of total mobilization, and the reduced staff appears to experience difficulties in maintaining effective control over individual farms. In an effort to make up for the shortage of personnel, the Food Estate is stimulating "mutual field inspections" by the farmers themselves.¹ Convictions for violating food regulations seem to be increasingly numerous and severe. There are indications, on the other hand, that Reichsnährstand officials in some instances are reluctant to enforce unpopular regulations.² The relaxation of controls seems to be particularly pronounced in the area on the left bank of the Rhine, where growers were warned repeatedly against bartering or selling rationed goods freely to consumers, and against hoarding potatoes.³ There can be no

1. NDZ, 25 April 1944. Shopkeepers are also asked to spy upon each other. See Berliner Illustrierte Nachtausgabe, 5 March 1944.
2. NS Landpost, 29 September 1944.
3. National Zeitung, Märs ed., 14 October 1944; Bern cable, 18 November 1944; National Zeitung, Wesel ed., 20 November 1944.

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

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doubt but that the breakdown of transportation, the fear of inflation and insecurity, and the shortage of industrial goods available to farmers will increase the reluctance of farmers to surrender their produce through legal channels. Hoarding of storable foodstuffs may be expected to increase at all levels of distribution. The urge to build up livestock herds -- in part as a hedge against inflation and in part because of the suitability of animal products for trade in the black-market -- will constitute a powerful incentive to divert crops from direct human consumption to livestock feeding. There are also indications that distribution controls are deteriorating, particularly in cities subject to frequent air raids.¹ At the same time, the population of the Reich is further swelled by thousands of refugees from evacuated areas.

There are, on the other hand, a number of favorable factors which will enable Germany to cushion the impact of the deterioration in her basic food position. At the end of 1943-44, Germany's carry-over of grain may have been as high as 5,000,000 tons. Stocks of sugar probably amount to several hundred million tons. When the fodder shortage necessitated increasing the slaughter of livestock, part of the windfall gain of pork and beef was stored as an "iron reserve."²

1. PID, 5 October 1944.
2. This is a reserve for emergencies. Bern cable, 29 February 1944; Bern cable, 23 May 1944; Bern cable, 25 October 1944; DAZ, 30 November 1944.

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Date

Livestock brought from the evacuated areas in the east and west of Germany is being slaughtered and the meat is either preserved or substituted for rations of fats and cheese, thus enabling diversion of these scarce items to the "iron reserve."¹ While the total size of these food reserves is unknown, it is safe to assume that they are amply sufficient to tide Germany over to the next harvest. Furthermore, all the remaining livestock must of course be considered as stocks on the hoof which could be used in an emergency.

Nevertheless, Germany is saving her accumulated stocks for future contingencies by reducing rations to what is generally regarded as the bare minimum required for the maintenance of health and essential activity. In October 1944, the bread ration was cut by 200 grams a week for normal consumers, heavy and very heavy workers, and by 100 grams for self-suppliers and children.² The practice of distributing extra rations of meat, butter, bread, and coffee after air raids is to be discontinued except in cases of exceptionally heavy attacks on the larger cities, and even then will be limited to persons who are not evacuated.³ As a result of these restrictions, the daily energy intake of the normal consumer has declined by at least 100 calories, to less than

1. DNB, 27 September 1944; Bern cable, 8 November 1944.
2. NPD, 16 October 1944. This measure will save 350,000 to 400,000 tons of grain in 1944-45.
3. Westfälische Landeszeitung, Rote Erde, Dortmund 3 October 1944.

1900 calories, and the weighted average consumption of the civilian non-farm population currently does not exceed 2200 calories per day.¹ Furthermore, the use of barley for beer and coffee substitutes will be curtailed and it appears that for the first time oats will be used as an admixture to bread.² It is interesting to note that simultaneously with this further curtailment of German consumption, the Nazi government has felt obliged to raise the rations of foreign workers.³

Germany's concern for her stockpile may be explained in part by the serious disruption of transportation caused by the air war and the increased demands of her armed forces. The more frequent the interruptions in transportation, the greater the need for maintaining ample food stocks in any locality threatened by such interruptions. Moreover, some late crops such as potatoes and sugar beets are threatened by spoilage if transportation cannot be made available promptly after harvest, before freezing weather sets in, with possibly serious consequences for the food supply. Finally, food stocks are exposed to destruction by Allied bombing and to capture by Allied ground operations. It is not surprising, therefore, that the German government feels impelled to main-

1. By comparison, the average daily consumption of the non-farm civilian exceeds 3000 calories in the United States, and 2800 calories in the United Kingdom.
2. NPD, 14 October 1944.
3. Bremer Nachrichten, 27 February 1944 and elsewhere.

tain abnormally large reserves.

Transportation and distribution are by far the most vulnerable sectors in the German food economy. There is considerable evidence that local breakdowns in distribution, superimposed on a generally tight food supply, are contributing to the disruption of Germany's war effort where it counts most — behind the front lines, particularly in Western Germany. The repeated bombing of the Mittelland Canal seems to have caused a serious potato shortage in the Ruhr and Lower Rhine areas. Deliveries by rail are behind schedule, and intermediary storage depots have been set up.¹ Shipments of grain are also reported hampered by the strained transportation situation.² The tenseness of the situation is suggested by an announcement of the Reichsnährstand³ that uniform distribution of specific foods throughout Germany will be abandoned. Local surpluses of vegetables, fruits, wheat, and other products will tend to be consumed where they are produced, and the inter-regional trade in foodstuffs will be limited increasingly to making up the caloric deficits of regions which are deficient in foods in general. Posters have been put up in all district centers calling on the population to "bear with temporary insufficiencies in some regions hitherto well

1. DNB, 27 November 1944.

2. Marktberichte des Reichsnährstandes, 8 October 1944.

3. DAZ, 17 November 1944.

supplied... and make do with what can be produced or procured locally."¹ Complete elimination of all cross hauls of calories would result in a considerable saving in the total volume of food traffic. Furthermore, every citizen has been called upon to provide himself with an iron ration of non-perishable foodstuffs² so that he will not depend exclusively on the special reserve stocks set aside for air-raid victims.

In spite of these measures, local food shortages may well assume major proportions in the course of the current crop year; but it is probably that the full impact of the adverse factors will not be felt until 1945-46. In that year, the additional curtailment in fertilizer allotments³ decreed this fall will have resulted in a further sharp decline in crop yields, and stocks will no longer be sufficient to make up the difference between domestic production and the present rate of consumption.

1. NYT, 11 December 1944.
2. Der Angriff, 18 November 1944.
3. In November, Minister of Agriculture and Food Backe announced a further reduction of nitrogen allotments to 40 percent of last year (23 percent of pre-war), (DNE, 19 November 1944). Allotments of potash and lime were also reduced (Bern cable, 21 October 1944). With average weather conditions, these reductions in fertilizer consumption alone will cause a 5 percent decline in crop yields.

CONTROL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

R & A 2318S
SECRET

British Policy in Italy

The widespread criticism of British action in the recent Italian cabinet crisis, in addition to focussing attention on problems of Allied consultation in matters concerning liberated territories, has raised some doubt as to whether the present British tactics of supporting rightist groups and monarchist leaders in Italy is well calculated to advance even purely British aims in the country.

For some time it has appeared that British policy in Italy differs considerably from that of the other two chief Allies. The United States, as an extra-European power without special interests in Italy, has been primarily interested in the re-establishment of Italy as a peaceful, democratic state. This has been emphasized by several official statements, including the State Department declaration of 5 December, which by implication criticized British intervention in the formation of the new Italian cabinet, and dissociated the United States from the British veto of Count Sforza. The USSR, to judge by its past actions, takes only a secondary interest in Italy but, like the United States, tends to favor Italy's national recovery under a popular government representing all shades of democratic opinion. British policy, on the other hand, would appear to be strongly influenced by a traditional concern for the safety of British imperial communications along the Mediterranean-Red Sea route. This policy is apparently being implemented at present by two chief means: (1) opposition to the revival of Italian military power, and (2) an attempt, by supporting monarchist and other socially conservative forces in Italy, to secure a pro-British Italian foreign policy and to secure protection against the spread of Communism.

The declared policy of all three major Allied powers has been to promote a maximum contribution to the war effort by the Italian Government and people. Theoretically, at least, this consideration outweighs all others, and the extent of Italian aid has been made the criterion for any adjustment of the armistice conditions. In practice, however, the Italian military contribution has been relatively slight. The number of Italian troops engaged in actual combat has been strictly limited.

Italian political leaders have shown extreme restiveness under these limitations, which they consider intimately connected with the problem of Italy's future in a world dominated by the United Nations. In the absence of official explanation, Italians have frequently expressed a belief that these restrictions represent a deliberate policy of preventing full Italian participation in the war, and ultimate responsibility for this policy is often attributed to the British rather than to the United States. While conscription of two Italian military classes is now reported under

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-73

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way, it is not yet clear what proportion of these troops will be used for front line duty.

A further means of preventing any revival of an Italian military threat to Britain would be the dissolution of the former Italian colonial empire. One reason for the British veto of Count Sforza in the recent cabinet crisis may have been Sforza's consistent support of Italian claims for retention of the pre-Fascist colonial empire. An official British statement of November 1943, made without consulting the United States Government, affirmed that the Allies (sic) are determined not to revive but to liquidate the Italian empire. Prime Minister Churchill has described this as "lost, irretrievably lost." Foreign Secretary Eden has disclaimed any Allied intention of returning all Italy's North African possessions, and there is evidence that the British Government also wishes to abolish Italian sovereignty in Eritrea, Somaliland, and the Dodecanese Islands. The improvement of Britain's position along the Mediterranean-Red Sea route at Italian expense would not necessarily involve British acquisition of former Italian possessions. Such an aim could be equally well served by transferring Italian territories of strategic importance to neighboring states such as France, Greece, Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Ethiopia. The resultant frictions between Italy and its neighbors might even be considered conducive to the establishment of firmer British control in the Mediterranean.

In Italian internal affairs, the British, American, and Soviet Governments are committed by numerous official declarations to the elimination of Fascism from Italy and a free choice by the Italian people of their own future form of democratic government. In practice, however, the British Government and its representatives have consistently supported the monarchist and other socially conservative groups in Italy.

During 1943 and early 1944, despite increasing evidence of the unpopularity of Premier Badoglio, the British Government long resisted every effort to replace him by a six-party coalition government. In June 1944 when such a change appeared unavoidable, the British Government accepted it with apparent dissatisfaction, and insisted that the new Bonomi cabinet pledge itself to take no action against the monarchy until after the liberation of Italy. This contrasted with the attitudes of both the United States Government, which was sympathetic and which declined to support the British in withholding initial recognition from the Bonomi coalition government, and the Soviet Government, which was first to congratulate the new cabinet on its assumption of office.

Official explanations of the British attitude were based exclusively on military considerations. Prime Minister Churchill in his speech of 22 February 1944 stated that support of the Badoglio regime was based on its "readiness and ability to fight the Germans and thus lighten the burden of Allied troops" and expressed apprehension lest "a more broadly based Italian government — might try to make its position good with the Italian people by resisting, as much as it dared, the demands made on them in the interests of the Allied armies." Though these arguments are cogent,

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their force has been weakened by the limitations which were placed on the military effort of the Badoglio regime, and Italian observers have come increasingly to the conclusion that the British Government favors maintenance of a monarchical-conservative regime as a tool for advancing British political interests. During the period of the first Bonomi cabinet, from 10 June to 26 November 1944, this impression was kept alive by rumors of British-sponsored conservative plans to upset the six-party government, and by Churchill's continued warm references to Badoglio, who appears to have played a prominent role in these rightist maneuvers.

Although the immediate issues which precipitated the cabinet crisis of last November were the leftist parties' dissatisfaction with the progress of the purge and attempts to increase leftist representation in the government, British action during the crisis has further strengthened this impression. The British veto of Sforza was strongly condemned even among Italian conservatives, and widespread criticism was voiced in the United States and in Britain itself. The American State Department announced that it expected the Italians "to work out their problems of Government along democratic lines without influence from outside."

Further resentment was caused in Italian circles by the British attitude toward the Committee of National Liberation, which claims to represent the will of the Italian people. The Committee has pointed out that Bonomi was its candidate for Premier before the fall of Rome, that his cabinet was regarded as representative of the Committee, and that any claim Bonomi or his government might have to popular representation rested directly upon them. British authorities, however, publicly stated they regard the Committee only as a representative of the six parties composing it. It is significant that Bonomi, who had been criticized by leftist groups for his increasingly conservative policy, refused to consult the Committee at any time during the crisis, although he interviewed both the Lieutenant General of the Realm and Allied authorities. Thus British support for Bonomi, who after a fortnight of negotiations succeeded in forming a new cabinet without the participation of the Socialist or Action Parties, amounted in effect to support of conservative and monarchist forces.

Bonomi's success in forming a new government at the request of the Lieutenant General would appear, temporarily at least, to have strengthened the position of the monarchy. However, in view of his failure to enlist the unanimous support of the parties forming the Committee of National Liberation, there seems little prospect that the second Bonomi government will prove more stable than its predecessor.

Examination of the results obtained by British policy since the surrender of Italy strongly suggests that the methods chosen are not well adapted to the ends in view. Even if the British were to succeed in imposing a monarchist-conservative regime in Italy, it is by no means certain that such a regime would always pursue a loyally pro-British foreign policy. The mere fact that such a regime existed by virtue of British support would render it the more susceptible to domestic attack, and all the

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more anxious to emancipate itself from the British "yoke." Furthermore it is doubtful whether such a government could serve as an effective check on the growth of Communism. The spectacular growth of the Italian Communist Party during the past year seems to be attributable in large measure to the situation resulting from British support of the monarchy.

All available information on the Italian situation would indicate that in the long run no attempt to maintain an unpopular conservative government can succeed except at a heavy cost, possibly involving either foreign military occupation or domestic military dictatorship. Moreover, an unsuccessful attempt to reduce Italy to a position of political and military subservience would prove even more dangerous to British interests than a successful one. It would tend to antagonize the Italian population, particularly the leftist and democratic elements, while fostering the growth of reactionary nationalistic groups interested in discrediting democratic government. It would tend to place Italy in any future camp of revisionist countries interested in upsetting the post-war status quo, which in turn would prejudice the interests of other Allied nations, including the United States.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.


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12 January 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr. ✓
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a memorandum, the intelligence in which was obtained from two dispatches received from the OSS representative in Caserta. This memorandum deals with the expectation that Saragat will decline the offer of the Italian Ambassadorship to France, and the request of Italian Communists for diplomatic posts in South America.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State

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By Authority of CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

12 January 1945

ITALY: Saragat Expected to Decline Offer of
Ambassadorship to France; Communists
Request Diplomatic Posts to South America.

Giuseppe Saragat, Socialist minister in the first Bonomi cabinet, is reported to have been sounded out again as to his availability for the post of Ambassador to France. Saragat, however, is expected to decline the offer, as he wishes to remain in Italy and play a more active part in the internal affairs of the Socialist Party. He is said to fear that Pietro Nenni is flirting with the idea of merging the Socialists with the Communist Party.

Foreign Minister De Gasperi has reportedly been urged by Communist leaders to appoint Communists to diplomatic posts in South America. Although advised by a colleague that such appointments would be "rather unwise", De Gasperi feels that an exception might be made in the case of Mexico, which country would not object to a Communist as head of the Italian mission. No envoy is to be sent to Argentina for the time being. According to De Gasperi, "the United States Government would not permit us to send anyone", because of the strained relations between the United States and the Farrel government.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 11 January)

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By Authority of

CIA 006684
SR Date MAY 6 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


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CONTROL

9 January 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the OSS representative in Caserta, setting forth Marshal Tito's comments on Allied military aid and the American attitude toward the Partisan movement.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 January 1945

SECRET
CONTROL

YUGOSLAVIA: Tito Comments on Allied Military Aid and American Attitude Toward the Partisan Movement.

The OSS representative in Caserta has transmitted the following information:

On 6 January, in the course of a prolonged interview with the OSS representative in Belgrade, Marshal Tito dwelt at length on the attitude of the United States and American officials in Italy toward Yugoslavia and "my movement", as he called the Partisan activities. In answer to a suggestion that the lack of cooperation and hostility encountered by American field commanders was causing suspicion as to his real objectives, both military and political, he asserted vigorously that he had nothing to hide. He expressed bewilderment at the "amazing" political attitude of some American officers in Italy and repeated reports from his Acting Foreign Minister, Smodlaka, of some "incredibly irritating" actions of Americans on the Advisory Council for Italy. Tito suggested that American reactionaries, incited by the former Yugoslav Ambassador Fotich, had greatly damaged his reputation. "The majority of Americans are opposed to my regime", he said, "but what are they going to do about it?"

When Tito complained of the paucity of supplies furnished him by the Allies, it was pointed out that the Allies had equipped almost half his army. In reply to his vehement denial official figures were quoted. These apparently took him aback, and he suggested half jokingly that they must include arms dropped to Mihailovich forces. At his repeated insistence, Tito was furnished complete lists of supplies delivered by the Allies. He appeared surprised at these and gave the impression that he had never comprehended the full extent of Allied aid. The interview ended cordially, with Tito expressing his hope that one day he would be visited not with complaints but with 5000 American trucks to haul his artillery.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 8 January)

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SR MAY 6 1975

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203(14)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

8 January 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Caserta office of this agency, concerning the agreement of the Italian cabinet on Tarchiani as Ambassador to the United States.

John Magruder
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

cc: Department of State

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By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975

203(12)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 January 1945

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CIA 006687

ITALY: Cabinet Agrees on Tarchiani as Ambassador to the United States.

By SR Date MAY 6 1975

The following information dated 5 January has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Caserta:

After considerable discussion, all political parties in the Italian cabinet have agreed on the appointment of Alberto Tarchiani /a member of the Action Party and strong supporter of Sforza/ as Ambassador to the United States. The Chief opposition to the appointment came from the Communists who regard Tarchiani as one of the strongest opponents of Communism in Italy. Many members of the cabinet, including Premier Bonomi, were hesitant, since they felt the ambassador should not come from a party outside the government. However, after examining all candidates, including Luigi Einaudi (Governor of the Bank of Rome) and Quinto Quintieri (leader of the Italian financial mission to the United States), they decided that Tarchiani was the only possible choice. Sforza was informed of this decision by Bonomi two days ago.

Career officials of the Foreign Ministry have engaged in a whispering campaign to block the appointment of Tarchiani with a view to appointing a diplomat or business man. They have spread the rumor that Kirk does not favor Tarchiani and would prefer a business representative. Spokesmen of the moderate left and center parties reportedly believe that the present rumor campaign is simply a Foreign Ministry intrigue. However, they have expressed a fear that its continuation might create the false impression that the United States was acting in a manner reminiscent of Britain's in the Sforza case, and might handicap the resumption of normal Italo-American diplomatic relations.

OSS analysts in Washington comment that there is little relation between the Sforza case (which involved British disapproval of a proposed Foreign Minister) and any American opinion concerning Tarchiani, since an ambassador is not customarily appointed until it has been ascertained that he is persona grata in the country to which he is to be accredited. The parallel drawn by Italian spokesmen would indicate their strong sensitivity to any real or imagined foreign interference in governmental appointments.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 5 January)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

6 January 1945

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A
No. 2791, "The First Two Months of the New Guatemalan
Government", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch
of this office and classified as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

Enclosure
(Copy No. //)

203(12)
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RRP Date FEB 10 1972

Regraded Unclassified

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 2791

THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF THE
NEW GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1944)

Description

An analysis of the program of President-elect Arévalo and the record of the new regime, including a discussion of anti-government rumors and the problems which the new administration must solve.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DEC 23 1944

Copy No. 11

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

By RRP Date FEB 10 1972

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY

The overwhelming and popular election of Juan José Arévalo as President of Guatemala apparently indicates that the new government of Guatemala has lived up to its promise to hold honest elections.

Although there have been many rumors unfavorable to the governing Junta, it is showing its democratic intentions by taking energetic measures to eradicate all remnants of the Ubico regime. The armed forces have been purged of Ubiquistas; the police have been completely reorganized; and steps have been taken to assist the Indian population. A complete revision of the Guatemalan constitution is already under way.

Despite these measures of the Junta, the pro-democratic, liberal program announced by President-elect Arévalo will succeed only if the new administration is able to unify the widely disparate groups among its backers and to gain at least the passive sympathy of the Indian majority of the country's population.

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

[REDACTED]

GUATEMALA HAS just held presidential elections in which Juan José Arévalo was overwhelmingly elected. Since Arévalo was by far the most popular candidate in the field, the new government of Guatemala has apparently lived up to its promise to hold honest elections.

A. The Program of Arévalo

Juan José Arévalo--who is to take office on 15 March 1945--has admittedly had little political experience. He was briefly employed by Ubico in the Ministry of Education, but was dismissed after attempting to institute educational reforms. He then lived as an exile in Argentina and taught for years at the University of La Plata, which was then noted for its liberal and in part even moderately socialist tendencies. Last September Arévalo finally returned to Guatemala to seek the presidency with a program of "ethical or spiritual socialism". He hopes to give special emphasis to extending education in Guatemala, where over 80 per cent of the population is illiterate, but his party also supports many other

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
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State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

progressive reforms such as the encouragement of cooperatives, social security legislation, and minimum wages.

In the field of foreign policy, Arévalo has expressed opposition to the ideology of Hispanidad, which he connects with "the backward feudal system of the past". He has also made known his hostility to the present Argentine regime, whose domestic practices, he feels, would have to be included in any inter-American discussion of its claim to recognition. He has further pronounced himself in favor of close cooperation with the United States and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, while describing the dictatorial regimes of Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador as belonging "to the past".¹

B. Anti-government Rumors

The election of Arévalo and the excellent record of the new government indicate that it is sincere in its democratic intentions, despite persistent rumors to the contrary. Indeed these rumors may be a deliberate campaign to discredit the Junta at home and in the United States. Immediately after the 20 October revolt rumors began to circulate that the revolt had really been planned by old-line conservative elements. The Central American Democratic Union declared that many of the families which aided the revolt do, in effect, "belong to the ultra-

1. Excelsior, Mexico City, 2 September 1944; ONA, Mexico City, 4 December 1944; WTIF, 8 December 1944.
 2. CIDS 41370, Guatemala, 21 October 1944.
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State Dept. letter, 1-11-78

conservative nuclei". The Union states, however, that it is only natural that pro-democratic conservatives should collaborate with a truly representative government.³ Vague rumors unfavorable to the new government have also appeared in the United States press.⁴

The most specific statement came from General Federico Ponce, the ousted president, who ascribed his fall to a supposed alliance of Communists, Sinarquistas, Nazis, Fascists, and Palangistas, although he later decided that he had been overthrown by "a totally Nazi organization, of the most perfect German type."⁵ Unidentified Central American exiles in Mexico later produced another rumor that the Junta intended to impose the election of Adrián Recinos, a civilian conservative formerly associated with the Ubico regime though not included on the Junta's "black list", supposedly in order to please the United States.⁶ Even some members of the revolutionary movement, headed by Eugenio Silva Peña, who has been named Ambassador to the United States, have expressed fear that the overwhelming popularity of Arévalo may lead in effect to a single-party system and again to dictatorship.⁷ However, these and many similar fears and rumors appear to be contradicted by the democratic and reform measures of the new regime and by the holding of apparently honest elections.

3. Novedades, Mexico City, 30 October 1944.

4. Inter-American, November 1944.

5. Excelsior, Mexico City, 24 October 1944; Novedades, Mexico City, 1 November 1944.

6. AP, Mexico City, 20 November 1944.

7. ONA, Mexico City, 4 December 1944; CIDD 106029, Guatemala, 10 November 1944.

0. The Record of the New Regime

The record of the Junta is further proof of the democratic nature of the new Guatemalan regime which followed the fall of the Fonce dictatorship last October. The revolutionary Junta has devoted itself to the task of eradicating all the remnants of the Ubico regime. Thus all the civil and military governors of the country's Departments were quickly changed,⁸ and changes of government personnel and organization were so thorough as to remove virtually all elements closely bound to past dictatorships.

1. The Armed Forces

The outstanding feature of the new government's policy has been its thorough purge of the armed forces. In two days during the first week of November one-third of the old Ubico regime's numerous generals were deported to Mexico, and at that time it was believed that virtually all Guatemalan generals would be forced to leave the country. The deportations appear to have been carried out amicably for the most part. The majority of the exiled generals probably will be allowed to return to Guatemala when the new government is completely established, and to retire on an official pension if they refrain from political activity.⁹

8. Novedades, Mexico City, 7 November 1944.

9. CIDG 108028, Guatemala, 6 November 1944.

The complete change in the control of the Army became evident in the fact that Major Francisco Xavier Arana, a member of the revolutionary Junta and only about thirty years old, is acting War Minister, while another major is Chief of Staff of the Guatemalan Army.¹⁰ Apparently to assure the Junta of the loyalty of the Army despite the extensive purge, a higher salary scale for the Army was announced less than a week after the revolution.¹¹

The police have been even more thoroughly reorganized. The national police force, which was one of the firmest supporters of Ubico, has been abolished, and the Junta has requested the United States Department of Justice to send instructors to train a Civil Guard to replace it.¹² The secret police force was also abolished, and its funds assigned to the Ministry of Education. The anti-militaristic mood of the government is illustrated by demilitarization of the National Symphony Orchestra and by the decision to raze completely the fort of San José in the capital and to replace it with a "pleasant park for the recreation of Guatemalan children".¹³

2. The Rural Population

Other measures of the new government favor the peasant class. Such are the decrees to abolish compulsory highway work, one of the most oppressive burdens on rural Indians, to end illegal forced labor,

10. Diario Latino, San Salvador, 3 November 1944.

11. CIDR 108023, Guatemala, 3 November 1944.

12. CIDS 44089, Guatemala, 8 December 1944.

13. Diario Latino, San Salvador, 3 November 1944.

and to abrogate the Ubico decree by which landowners were authorized to mete out any treatment they saw fit to intruders "caught stealing" on their property.¹⁴ The rural workers may also be benefited by the fact that the new government is one of the largest landlords in Guatemala as a result of its own and previous measures. Earlier in the year General Ponce, then president, began a program for expropriating the important German landed holdings, which the Junta promises to continue. Now, under charges that former dictators Ubico and Ponce and their associates were implicated in financial irregularities, their properties have been subjected to intervention by the new government pending a more definite disposition of their cases.¹⁵ The government thus finds itself in direct control of all these properties, including the lands of General Ubico himself, who, after taking office, became the greatest private landowner in Guatemala, despite his much-publicized campaign for honesty in government. As a result, the new government has a real opportunity to begin at once to carry out its plans for improving the lot of Guatemala's Indian laborers.

3. Constitutional Developments

The new government is also aiming at a thoroughgoing revision of the constitution. At the end of November the revolutionary Junta prepared the way for a complete constitutional reorganization by abro-

14. Diario Latino, San Salvador, 3, 6, and 9 November 1944.

15. CIDG 106023, Guatemala, 3 November 1944.

gating the greater part of the existing constitution (including Ubico's revisions) and by asking that the newly elected Assembly convoke a Constituent Assembly to frame a new fundamental statute. At the same time the Junta proclaimed the basic principles of the revolution, including limited women's suffrage, legislative representation of minorities, and the right of revolution.¹⁶ These principles were then endorsed by the Assembly, and are to guide the Constituent Assembly which will meet in January to draw up a new constitution.¹⁷


D. Problems of the New Regime

Any liberal revolution in Latin America usually brings forth at once a new constitution and many generous plans for reform. Guatemala now appears to be in this stage, and the reform measures of the Junta are not surprising, save perhaps in their intended thoroughness. However, Arévalo will inherit serious problems from the provisional government, which may lead to his downfall if he cannot solve them. In addition to the need for reforms, there will be the difficult problem of holding on to the government. The power of the well-entrenched groups which supported Ubico has not been completely liquidated; they will be alert for any opportunity to oust the government. Arévalo will also have to reconcile increasingly greater differ-

16. UP, Guatemala, 29 November 1944.

17. New York Times, 11 December 1944.

ences among the disparate groups, ranging from Communists to extreme conservatives, who backed the recent revolt. Furthermore, the popular support of the revolutionary movement is limited to the capital, the few larger towns, and the small number of organized workers in rural areas, primarily employees of the United Fruit Company. The participation of Guatemala's Indian masses in the revolt tended to favor Ponce and indirectly to favor Ubico. Since Guatemala's Indians, who form a majority of the population, are uneducated and without political consciousness, the new administration will continue to face the danger that they may, as in the past, be exploited for political ends by dissident elements within or without the government.



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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

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
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4 January 1945

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Caserta office of this agency. This message reports that criticism of Soviet activity by Rumanian Premier Radescu brings a promise of help in solving Rumanian problems of production and transport.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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By Authority of _____
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 January 1945

RUMANIA: Criticism of Soviet Activity by Premier Radescu
Brings Promise of Help in Solving Rumanian Prob-
lems of Production and Transport.

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bucharest:

On 30 December, Premier Radescu is reported to have issued statements to press representatives in Bucharest criticizing Soviet activity in Rumania, charging specifically that Soviet removal of Rumanian equipment and Soviet administration of transportation made it impossible for Rumania to fulfill the armistice conditions. Radescu also delivered a radio broadcast on the same subject.

Vinogradov, acting head of the Allied (Soviet) Armistice Control Commission, immediately requested an audience with Radescu, who is said to have explained that he considered it his duty to have put the facts of the situation on record, and to have threatened to resign if the Soviets continued to remove the means of production and deny transportation facilities. Vinogradov, who apparently was very conciliatory in his manner, replied that he would do everything in his power to help Radescu solve these difficulties, and requested Radescu not to allow publication of his critical statement in the Rumanian press. Radescu agreed and the interview closed in an atmosphere of friendliness. Radescu later asserted to several persons that his statement had been made in order to obtain a clear-cut Soviet reaction which would bring about either his resignation or a strengthening of his position in relation to the Soviets.

The above developments are regarded in Bucharest circles as significant indication that the Soviets wish to support the Radescu government. Observers have expressed the opinion that Vinogradov's request for the suppression of Radescu's statement was made in order to avert a government crisis which might result in the fall of the Radescu cabinet.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 3 January)

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 January 1945


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CONTROL

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information
is copy of a memorandum which the Acting Director,
OSS, is sending today to the President. This memo-
randum reports that De Gaulle's refusal to recognize
the Lublin Committee is said to have threatened a
breakdown in the Franco-Soviet negotiations.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By Authority of _____

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975

203(12)

~~TOP SECRET~~



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONTROL

1 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Paris:

The recent Franco-Soviet conferences in Moscow are reported almost to have broken down because of the refusal of De Gaulle and his provisional government to comply with a Soviet demand for recognition of the Lublin [Soviet-sponsored Polish] Committee as a preliminary condition for the Franco-Soviet pact. It is said that the French delegation was not notified until early on the morning before the conclusion of the pact that the Soviets would sign despite the French refusal to recognize the Lublin Committee.

[The OSS representative in Paris comments that the French attitude in Moscow may well have been influenced by Churchill's policy, and that the present move of the French provisional government, in sending a delegate to Lublin for handling affairs "concerned with prisoners", may represent a compromise arrangement.

[The OSS representative emphasizes that, while the source of this information is believed reliable, the report is unconfirmed and should not be accepted unless substantiated by other sources.]

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

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